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A number of bills were introduced into the current session of the legisla-
ture at the suggestion of the Legal Aid Society of Philadelphia. Their purpose
is to solve some of the procedural and substantive problems which the staff of
the society and other lawyers had been meeting frequently in their day to day
practice.
A. Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act
One of these, Senate Bill 255, proposed to revise the deficiency judgment
provisions of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act of June 28, 1947.' This act
treats comprehensively the subject of installment sales of motor vehicles and
makes provision for the resulting rights and duties of the parties after a motor
vehicle has been repossessed by the seller.
Section 25 of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act set up a fifteen day per-
iod after the buyer's motor vehicle has been repossessed, during which period
he may redeem his vehicle and terminate the installment contract. If the buyer
fails to do so, then he is barred by Section 26A from any further claim to the
motor vehicle and collateral security. Paragraph B of the same section pro-
vides that even though the buyer fails to redeem, the seller does not have the
right to proceed against him for a deficiency unless the seller first held a pub-
lic or private sale of the repossessed motor vehicle and' collateral security.
Section 27 of the act then provides that if the proceeds of the resale are
not sufficient to defray the expenses of the sale and of retaking and storing
the motor vehicle and the net balance due upon the contract plus default charges,
the seller may recover the deficiency from the buyer. There is the proviso, how-
ever, that the buyei may have the reasonable value of the motor vehicle at the
time of resale determined in any proceeding brought by the seller to recover
the deficiency, the resale price being prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence
of such reasonable value. The section further provides that it does not apply to
a deficiency on resale made prior to the effective date of the act.
It will be seen that these provisions of the Motor Vehicle Financing Act
bear some resemblance to the Deficiency Judgment act of 1941,2 whose primary
purpose was to regulate deficiency judgments arising out of mortgage fore-
closures where the real estate was acquired by the mortgagee at the foreclosure
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sale. Although previous acts of the legislature on that subject had been held un-
constitutional, the 1941 act was sustained by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in the case of Fidelity Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Allen.8 The court in a per cur-
iam decision cited the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case
of Gelfert v. National City Bank,4 which sustained the New York deficiency
judgment act. The latter case denied the claim that the act violated the contracts
clause of the federal constitution, reasoning that the mortgagee is entitled to
no more than payment and that the statute in question did no more than restrict
the mortgagee to recovery of that for which he had contracted. Subsequently, in
the case of Pennsylvania Company v. Scott,5 the court held that the 1941 act
was constitutional even though applied to execution sales which had occurred
before the act was passed.
Although the 1941 act has worked very well in practice, the deficiency
judgment procedure under the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act was not quite
so successful.
During the year 1954, a flood of deficiency judgments on ancient bail-
ment leases of automobiles were entered in Philadelphia County, and the Legal
Aid Society was overwhelmed by the requests of harassed debtors seeking re-
lief. In most of the cases involved, the parties had purchased an automobile
under bailment lease ten or fifteen years before and because of depressed finan-
cial conditions had been unable to complete payment. As a result the cars had
either been repossessed or voluntarily returned to the agencies. In practically
all cases the debtors had no information as to the disposition of the automobiles
by the agencies; and the law existing at the time the sales were entered into of-
fered no protection whatsoever to the debtors against the collection of defi-
ciencies which seemed to be grossly exorbitant and unreasonable under the cir-
cumstances.
Since the resales in practically all of these cases had been made prior to
the effective date of the 1947 act, the latter act did not apply to them. However,
in many cases relief was obtained for the debtors on the ground that the assess-
ments of damages were fictitious since the sellers had no information at all
as to resale prices of the repossessed automobiles. Likewise, the assessments of
damages had included rentals to the end of the contracts instead of being lim-
ited to the time of repossession which was not permitted under existing law.
Senate Bill 255 was introduced to correct the weaknesses of the Motor Ve-
hide Sales Finance Act as applied to deficiency judgments. Sections 26 and
27 of the old act are repealed and new sections are added. Section 26 reenacts
most of the provisions of the former section but adds the important require-
ment that resale of the repossessed motor vehicle must be made within ninety
8 343 Pa. 428, 22 A.2d 896 (1941),
4 313 U. S. 221 (1941).
6 346 Pa. 13, 29 A.2d 328 (1942).
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days after the fifteen day redemption period has passed. Section 27 is substantial-
ly reenacted but adds a new provision that the holder must proceed within
thirty days of the resale to file a petition with the Common Pleas Court to
fix a fair and reasonable value of the motor vehicle at the time of the resale
and to determine if any deficiency exists. This petition is to be filed with the
Common Pleas Court of the county where the motor vehicle was originally sold
in the case where repossession occurs other than by legal process, and in the
case where possession was obtained by legal process in the same court which is-
sued the process. Where resales take place prior to the effective date of this
section petitions to fix fair value to determine the deficiency, if any, shall be
filed by the holder within sixty days after the act takes effect. The failure to
file petitions to fix fair value terminates the installment sales contract and dis-
charges the buyer from his obligations.
Secton 28 of the act is also amended to provide that within one year after
termination of the contract by surrender or repossession of the motor vehicle,
the seller shall, even though not requested therefor, furnish the buyer with a
complete and detailed statement of his account. Under the existing section it
is the duty of the seller to furnish such a statement only when requested to do
so by the buyer.
The above bill has been endorsed in principle not only by lawyers rep-
resenting defaulting buyers but by the Pennsylvania Industrial Bankers Associa-
tion which represents the great majority of finance companies in this state. It
is felt that the bill will cure demonstrated weaknesses in the existing act and
foster equity and fair dealing among both installment sellers and buyers.
B. Correcting Birth Records
Another problem which proved particularly vexing to the attorneys of
the Legal Aid Society concerned the correction of birth records in those cases
where the Division of Vital Statistics of the State Department of Health in-
dicated that it had no authority under existing law to make the requested cor-
rections. In these cases the department usually indicated that it would be pleased
to make the correction if some court order directing the same was obtained.
Accordingly, the practice arose of filing in the Common Pleas Courts of Phil-
adelphia County either a petition for declaratory judgment or a petition and
rule on the Department of Public Health for an order directing correction of
the birth record involved. When such order was obtained the department prompt-
ly made the correction.
However, in 1951 the Orphans' Court Act was passed setting forth the
jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court, inter alia, as follows:
"Section 301. Exclusive Jurisdiction. - The Orphans' Court shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of: . . . (15) Birth Records. Matters relating
to birth records, as provided by law."
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Following the passage of this act petitions were filed with the Orphans'
Court seeking correction of birth records. However, the Orphans' Court held
that it had no jurisdiction to amend or correct birth records since there was no
statute specifically granting such power to the court. Accordingly, petitions again
began to be filed in, the Common Pleas Courts. However, in the case of In re
Halohan Petition6 decided May 23, 1952, Judge Mawhinney of Common Pleas
Court No. 3 of Philadelphia County ruled that in view of the Orphans' Court
Act of 1950 and all past legislation dealing with the subject of recording births
and deaths, the jurisdiction, if any had been granted, to correct birth records
was in the Orphans' Court. He also suggested that if the Common Pleas Courts
had any jurisdiction at all in the matter, it would have to be sought in the Com-
mon Pleas Court of Dauphin County, since the Administrative Agency Law of
June 4, 1945, 7 specifically limited appeals from such agencies as the Division
of Vital Statistics to the Dauphin County courts. Thereafter, some efforts were
made to have the Dauphin County Court grant orders directing correction of
birth records. However, since most of the parties in such cases are of limited
means this procedure was not readily available because of the expense involved.
Accordingly, a bill was introduced and passed by the legislature as Act No. 116,
approved by the governor on August 4th, 1955, amending section 301, clause
15 of the Orphans' Court Act so that it reads as follows:
"(15) Birth Records. All proceedings which may be necessary
to be presented to a court for determination with regard to
issues concerning recordation of birth and birth records or the alteration,
amendment or modification of such birth records or the right to obtain
a certified copy of the same. Whenever a person is entitled to take an
appeal from the action of the Department of Health in connection with
any matters concerning birth records the appeal shall be taken to the
orphans' court of the county in which the person is a resident. In all
other matters in which a petition is addressed to a court in connection
with matters of birth records the filing of which petition is not in the
nature of an appeal, but is an original proceeding, shall be filed and
determined by the orphans' court of the county in which the petitioner
resides."
Since the above bill-gives plenary authority to the orphans' court on the
subject, it is felt that this act will answer the problem involved and permit
the obtaining of the necessary corrective orders without undue expense and litiga-
tion to the applicants.
6 80 D. & C. 582 (1952).




Attention of readers is called to the following errors which were made in
the printing of Professor Reed T. Phalan's Legislative Note on "Interests of
Remote Parties in Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code", 59 Dick.
L. Rev. 332:
At page 336, line 24, the sentence should read, "Many merchants have been
tempted to go through the motions of disposing of their businesses, while se-
cretly retaining interests upon which they realize after creditors give up trying
to collect."
On page 339, an additional footnote, No. 211/2, should be keyed to the
text at the end of line 30, and footnotes 20, 21 and 21 2 should read as fol-
lows:
20 Uniform Commercial Code, Sections 6-106, 6-111.
21 Miller v. T.I.C. Consumer Discount Co., 69 Pa. D & C. 585
(1949).
211 Kadair v. Serack, 63 Pa. D. & C. 27 (1947).
The editors regret the occurrence of these errors.
